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1. Introduction 
‘Progress’ is an evaluative concept. It refers to improvements over time, in contrast to periods 
of stagnation or even regression. We characterise events or processes as constituting progress. 
However, the same event may count as progress and regress at the same time, depending on 
the relevant respect. For example, the invention of nuclear power is technical progress, but at 
the same time it may be ecological regress. So when we characterise an event as progressive, 
we must always add the respect in which we consider it to be progressive. We can also 
characterise disciplines or cognitive practices as being progressive (over a certain period). We 
then evaluate these disciplines based on the results they produce. In these cases, the standard 
of evaluation is typically the discipline’s cognitive goal.   
There are different ways in which disciplines can be progressive. Fundamentally, one 
can distinguish between progress that is truth-related and progress that is not. Let me start 
with elucidating dimensions of disciplinary progress that are not truth-related. These 
dimensions of progress must be measured against cognitive values that are independent of 
truth. A discipline can be progressive by enlarging its problem space through adding new 
questions, problems, or topics, proposing additional theories, methods, and arguments, or 
creating richer conceptual structures.
1
 This is more than mere innovation. It not only changes 
but extends the space of objects to be understood. In philosophy, we often encounter this type 
of progress on the grand scale, when new paradigms of theorising enter the stage (e.g. around 
1800, when German Idealism explored ways in which the mind or conceptual structure might 
be constitutive of reality, or around 1900, with the linguistic turn). But enlargement of a 
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problem space may also happen within the continuous discussion of a received problem. 
Consider the problem of mental causation: How can the mind cause physical events if it is not 
itself reducible to the physical? This problem has been discussed at least since Descartes. But 
the debate changed dramatically when new conceptions of causation such as Lewis’ (1973) 
counterfactual analysis and the theory of agent causation (Chisholm 1976; O’Connor 2000) 
were proposed. Moreover, further new aspects of this problem were discovered when 
Jaegwon Kim
 
(1989) put forward his argument from explanatory exclusion, according to 
which there is no causal role for distinct mental events to play if the physical world is causally 
closed. Progress understood as an enlargement of the problem space in all of these cases 
involves the availability of new tools and positions for our theorising. 
One can also characterise a discipline as being progressive in a non-truth-related way 
if it differentiates problems, distinctions, arguments, methods, or theories over time.
2
 This can 
be done, e.g., by spelling out the details of a problem, by turning an informal worry into a 
formalised counterargument, or by making more and more implications of a given theory 
explicit. Let me illustrate this with a philosophical example. When we talk about the world, 
we not only mention individual things but also classify these things as belonging to common 
types. Platonism claims that such types are abstract, universal entities that exist independently 
of their instances. Aristotelians also believe that types are universals, but they restrict their 
existence to instantiated universals. In contrast, resemblance nominalism offers an extremely 
parsimonious worldview, according to which only individuals exist and all types supervene 
on primitive resemblance relations among these individuals. All three theories can tell a story 
about the nature of types. However, David Armstrong (1989) discovered that resemblance 
nominalism has the following, previously unobserved implication: Consider a red car, a red 
apple, and a green apple. Resemblance nominalism cannot explain why the car and the red 
apple are more similar to each other with respect to colour than the red apple and the green 
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apple. This is because resemblance nominalism can explain similarities only in virtue of 
resemblance relations between the primitive natures of the individuals, and it seems clear that 
at the fundamental level, the red apple and the green apple are more similar to each other than 
the red apple and the red car. Sometimes, as in this case, making implications explicit can also 
help us to see that a given theory has counterintuitive consequences. 
Finally, one can promote progressive research programs in a discipline by making 
progress in solving problems in a given paradigm (see Rapaport 1982). Conflicting programs 
can coexist even if they are quite successful in solving their inherent problems. So such 
progress may not give us a criterion to decide which paradigm is true or even superior to the 
other. In this sense, the parallel developments of epistemic internalism and reliabilism over 
the last thirty years can be understood as progressive research programs. Each of them faces a 
number of crucial problems. The most severe problems for internalism are the threat of an 
unstoppable regress of justification, the worry that, when understood internalistically, 
epistemic justification loses its connection to truth, and cases of justified belief based on 
forgotten evidence. Severe problems for reliabilism are the generality problem, i.e. the 
question of which type of a token belief process is the relevant one when one evaluates 
reliability, the problem of the new evil demon, i.e. the intuition that even wholly unreliable 
epistemic agents can have justified beliefs, and the problem that reliabilism must classify 
reliable beliefs as justified even if they are not based on any evidence. Both sides address 
these and other inherent problems and try to come up with solutions to or dissolutions of the 
problems. The internalist avoids the regress problem either by referring to ultimate, self-
evident justifiers or by turning towards mentalism, i.e. the theory that justification supervenes 
on one’s non-factive mental states, and the fact that mentalism loses the objective connection 
with truth is often treated as a virtue rather than a vice since the intuition of the new evil 
demon suggests that an objective truth connection is not required for justified belief. On the 
reliabilist side, different solutions to the generality problem have been offered (though none 
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of them so far seems fully satisfying), and in reply to the new evil demon case, reliabilists 
typically claim that this intuition is only about blameless belief rather than justified belief. 
Without going into too much detail here, it seems fair to say that although internalism and 
reliabilism are both progressive research programs, this has not led to general agreement 
about which of these is true.
3
 
We should distinguish the preceding dimensions of disciplinary progress (i.e. 
enlargement of a problem space, differentiation, and progressive research programs), which 
are not truth-related, from truth-related progress. Of course, I do not want to dispute that ways 
of progressing that are not conceptually related to truth may, under appropriate circumstances, 
nevertheless be instrumentally valuable for achieving truth-related progress. A discipline 
makes truth-related progress if and only if (and as long as) it collectively tends to converge 
on the truth over time, i.e. its practitioners largely agree on more and more true propositions 
over time. This can happen through the discovery of new facts, through a correction of 
previous errors, or through the discovery of true explanations and true solutions to problems. 
Often, a discipline’s truth-related progress correlates with a collective accumulation of 
knowledge. (Although depending on one’s theory of knowledge, collective agreement on the 
truth may not be sufficient for achieving knowledge.) 
Whereas pseudo-sciences such as astrology may make some progress that is not truth-
related – I do not see any reason why they cannot enlarge their repertoire of thinking or 
differentiate their cognitive resources, or why they should not be able to solve at least some of 
the problems they face –, it seems to be an essential feature of scientific disciplines that they 
make truth-related progress. The main reason for this is that truth is the aim of science,
4
 and 
our primary standard for measuring a discipline’s progress should be collective convergence 
to the discipline’s specific goal (Melnyk 2008; Dietrich 2010; Chalmers 2015: 4). Of course, 
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it is not easy to determine whether a discipline converges to truth. Obviously, collective 
convergence is not sufficient for progress because it might also be convergence to the false 
(Chalmers 2015: 7). But it is safe to claim that without collective convergence over time, 
without increasing agreement within a discipline, truth-related progress of that discipline is 
impossible. Isolated thinkers may make some truth-related progress without general 
agreement, but truth-related progress of the entire discipline requires collective convergence.  
There is also the question of how much truth-related progress a particular discipline 
makes during a specific period of time. The degree of collective convergence (which, as 
indicated above, is not the same as truth-related progress) can be measured along different 
dimensions. The following aspects are relevant here: (i) number: to what extent do relevant 
experts converge in their beliefs?, (ii) significance: is the disciplinary convergence limited to 
smaller and relatively local issues, or do we find convergence with respect to the big and 
fundamental questions in the field?, (iii) time: how quickly do beliefs converge on a specific 
answer to a question?, and (iv) linearity: is the convergence progressing in a linear way, or is 
it interrupted by periods of a higher diversity of views? 
According to the standard view, hard sciences such as physics or mathematics behave 
very differently from philosophy when it comes to collective convergence of views (Kornblith 
(2010) is a proponent of this standard view). Of course, even hard sciences do not progress in 
an entirely linear way. They also undergo revolutionary periods when paradigm changes 
occur. Before such changes, disagreement increases, and after these changes, when a new 
paradigm takes over, there is a lot of disagreement as well, at least in the initial phase. 
However, when we focus on the period between the initial introduction of a new theory and 
some time in advance of the ‘death’ of this theory, something like the illustration in Figure 1 
will be representative. At the beginning, the reactions of the experts will be strongly divergent 
– only a few will fully agree, while most of them will either suspend judgment or still accept 
conflicting theories that were successful in the past. After a while, the scope of expert 
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opinions will range from suspension to full belief. Then, the collective degree of belief 
converges to some number close to 1.  
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The situation in philosophy is, according to the standard view, completely different 
(see Figure 2). When we consider a new question in philosophy, there will be an initial phase 
of not knowing what to believe – here suspension of belief is the dominant position. After 
that, you find some polarisation such that the tendency to either strong belief or strong 
disbelief increases. Later on, philosophical views seem to be randomly distributed, with no 
tendency to any kind of collective convergence. This seems to suggest that there is absolutely 
no truth-related progress in philosophy. However, less radical positions can also be defended. 
In principle, three positions about the degree of truth-related progress in philosophy are 
possible. Skepticism about truth-related progress claims that there is no truth-related progress 
in philosophy. The opposite extreme is a symmetry view about truth-related progress, which 
claims that the degree of truth-related progress in philosophy approximates the degree of 
truth-related progress in the sciences. One does not find many advocates of this view, 
although naturalists who believe that there is a methodological continuity between philosophy 
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and the sciences may be tempted to accept such a symmetry view. Then, there is an 
intermediate position that I will call the ‘limited progress view’. According to this view, there 
is some truth-related progress in philosophy, but it is smaller, slower, and less significant than 
in the sciences. 
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In what follows, I will first consider arguments that support skepticism about truth-
related progress in philosophy, and I will argue that none of them is convincing. It will turn 
out that the limited progress view is the most plausible one for philosophy. Second, I will 
offer an explanation of the limitation of (truth-related) progress in philosophy that differs 
from the one offered by Chalmers (2015) in that, in contrast to Chalmers, I propose that 
methodological pluralism in philosophy is the key reason for the discipline’s limited progress. 
Third, I will outline some consequences of this explanation regarding the role that the history 
of philosophy plays for systematic philosophy. 
 
2. Arguments for skepticism about truth-related progress in philosophy 
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Many philosophers are explicitly skeptical about truth-related progress in philosophy. Here 
are some representative voices:  
 
Philosophy is not a science, because progress in philosophy is not a matter of 
expanding knowledge, of acquiring new truths about the world. … [I]t is 
indubitable that we know some things that the great philosophers of the past did 
not know. But the things we know that they didn’t know are not philosophical 
things. (Kenny 2005: 16) 
 
[I]t would be hard to claim that humanity today knows the answers to more 
philosophical questions than it did even in Plato’s time, as we seem not to know 
the answers to any philosophical questions. … Philosophers are no closer to 
achieving consensus … than they were in Plato’s day. (Melnyk 2008: 208) 
 
[I]f one asks a physicist or biologist, a historian or a mathematician what 
knowledge has been achieved in his subject, he can take one to a large library, 
and point out myriad books which detail the cognitive achievements of his 
subjects. But if one asks a philosopher for even a single book that will 
summarize the elements of philosophical knowledge … he will have nothing to 
present. There is no general, agreed body of philosophical knowledge …. 
(Hacker 2009: 130) 
 
Very unlike science, no part of philosophy advances. Philosophy is, except for 
some modernizing, exactly the same now as it has ever been. It has not 
progressed one iota. (Dietrich 2010: 333) 
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These philosophers seem to agree that philosophy neither accumulates collective knowledge 
nor shows any tendency to collective convergence. 
Let us now look more closely at the arguments that are offered in favour of skepticism 
about (truth-related) progress. Ernst (2013) gives three arguments against progress in 
philosophy that are representative of many skeptics. His first argument is the argument from 
modesty: 
 
Philosophers are typically reluctant to compete with the great philosophers of 
the past. Who would claim to understand human nature, the essence of the 
good, or our relation to the world better than Plato, Aquinas, or Kant? If there 
were progress in philosophy, this kind of modesty would be wrongheaded. 
However, it seems appropriate. (Ernst 2013: 8; my translation, TG) 
 
This argument can be reconstructed in the following way: 
 
(1) Current philosophers should not regard themselves as equal or superior to the 
great philosophers of the past. 
(2) If philosophy is progressive, current philosophers should regard themselves as 
equal or superior to the great philosophers of the past. 
(3) Therefore, philosophy is not progressive. 
 
Both premises, (1) and (2), are objectionable. Premise 1 has two readings. On the first 
reading, we should not believe that we are equal or superior to the great philosophers of the 
past. This seems true since the great philosophers of the past were cognitively exceptional 
figures, sometimes even geniuses, and most of us would clearly be massively overconfident if 
we regarded ourselves as equally endowed philosophers. However, under this reading, (2) is 
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false. If philosophy is progressive, its later achievements certainly benefit from the insights 
that were gained in the past. So we need not have a cognitive endowment that is equal or even 
superior to the great philosophers of the past in order to possess more philosophical 
knowledge than they did. Intellectual dwarfs on the shoulders of intellectual giants can still 
see more than the giants.  
On the second reading, (1) suggests that current philosophers are not in an epistemic 
position that is equal or superior to that of the great philosophers of the past. But this 
assumption is clearly question-begging in an argument against philosophical progress. For, if 
philosophy really is progressive, we certainly should claim that we are currently in an 
epistemically better position than the great philosophers of the past. There may be a weaker 
understanding of the argument from modesty such that it simply reflects current philosophers’ 
attitudes towards the great philosophers of the past. Under this interpretation, we can only 
conclude that current philosophers do not consider their discipline as being progressive. But 
this would not support the claim that philosophy is not progressive. One may also doubt the 
assumption that current philosophers are typically reluctant to compete with the views of the 
great philosophers of the past. Some current philosophers indeed claim that Plato was wrong 
about the essence of human nature, since he did not know what evolutionary anthropology has 
since discovered about the human species, utilitarians typically claim that Kant was wrong in 
claiming that the right has a deontological nature, and realists and externalists massively 
object to Kant’s view that reality is partly constituted by the human mind.   
Ernst’s second argument for progress skepticism is the argument from education:  
 
In contrast to the sciences, we teach philosophers by making them familiar with 
the philosophical tradition (e.g. Plato). Our insights cannot be simply gathered 
in textbooks. If there were progress in philosophy, it would not be required or 
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would even be harmful to teach the thoughts of the mighty dead to our students. 
(Ernst 2013: 8; my translation, TG) 
 
Here is the rational reconstruction of this argument: 
 
(1) We teach philosophy to students by teaching them the philosophical 
tradition. 
(2) If philosophy makes progress, teaching the philosophical tradition is not 
required. 
(3) Therefore, philosophy does not make any progress. 
 
Strictly speaking, this argument is invalid. To turn it into a valid argument, one must revise 
(1) in such a way that teaching philosophy requires teaching the philosophical tradition. 
However, this revised version of (1) is controversial. At least some philosophers believe that 
teaching the history of philosophy to students is dysfunctional for a proper philosophical 
education. Most prominently, Gilbert Harman expressed this view with his famous slogan 
‘Say “no” to the history of philosophy.’5 Premise (2) looks even more dubious. If philosophy 
were progressing quickly, then it would be unnecessary to teach the philosophical tradition for 
purely epistemic reasons. This much seems true. Nevertheless, (2) may be false. First, 
progress in philosophy is obviously much slower than progress in the sciences, because there 
is no accumulation of philosophical evidence through the invention of new technologies. 
Since the evidential basis for philosophy (i.e. rational intuitions and a priori insights) is pretty 
stable over time, it is reasonable to expect that the tenability of classic philosophical positions 
survives, in contrast with, e.g., classic physics. Second, even if there is no epistemic need to 
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teach students the philosophical tradition, there may be independent didactic reasons for this 
practice. Teaching the philosophical tradition might, e.g., help students grasp the ‘big picture’ 
behind certain ideas. This is something that plays an important role in philosophical but not in 
scientific education. So we should reject (2) anyway.  
Finally, Ernst presents his argument from research. Again, here is what it says: 
 
Even in research, classic philosophers such as, e.g., Plato are treated like 
contemporary colleagues. This only makes sense if there is no progress in 
philosophy. Otherwise, discussing classic philosophers would be a complete 
waste of time. This would be a discussion of positions that have long been 
outdated. (Ernst 2013: 8; my translation, TG) 
 
Through rational reconstruction we get the following argument: 
 
(1) It makes sense to treat classic philosophers like contemporary colleagues. 
(2) Treating classic philosophers in such a way makes sense only if there is no 
progress in philosophy. 
(3) Therefore, there is no progress in philosophy. 
 
This is a valid modus ponens. However, both premises are disputable. It is true that many, 
though not all, current philosophers treat some classic philosophers like contemporary 
colleagues. But it is still another question whether this practice makes sense or is reasonable. 
One can dispute the latter without disputing the former. Premise (2) looks even more 
worrisome. First, one should keep in mind that progress in philosophy, if there is any, is much 
slower than in the sciences because the relevant body of evidence is not rapidly expanding. 
But if this is true, it takes much longer for a philosophical view to become outdated. 
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Therefore, it might make sense to treat historical figures as colleagues regarding issues that 
progress sufficiently slowly for their views to not be outdated. Second, and more importantly, 
progress in philosophy, if there is such a thing, need not be linear. There is always the danger 
of regression by virtue of overlooking relevant perspectives or methods. Hence, the study of 
the classic philosophers might function as a corrective to avoid the pitfalls of regression, even 
if there is some progress in philosophy.  
Let me now turn towards a more powerful argument for skepticism about truth-related 
progress in philosophy, which is closely related to the standard view of philosophy mentioned 
in the introduction. As far as I know, Andrew Melnyk (2008) was the first to endorse this 
argument from persistent disagreement in print.
6
 Here is my reconstruction of his argument: 
 
(1) Philosophers’ beliefs do not collectively converge over time. 
(2) If there is no collective convergence in philosophy, then there is no 
collective truth-related progress in philosophy either. 
(3) Therefore, there is no collective truth-related progress in philosophy. 
 
The two premises of this argument look extremely plausible – at least initially. Anyone who 
has had some experience with philosophy will also have gathered anecdotal evidence that 
philosophers almost always and persistently disagree. This view is expressed in Melnyk’s and 
Hacker’s statements quoted above (‘Philosophers are no closer to achieving consensus … 
than they were in Plato’s day’ (Melnyk 2008: 208); ‘There is no general, agreed body of 
philosophical knowledge....’ (Hacker 2009: 130)). It also seems to be confirmed by the 2009 
PhilPapers Survey of philosophers’ beliefs that was recently analysed by Bourget & Chalmers 
(2014). So premise 1 seems difficult to reject. Premise (2) turns out to be conceptually true if 
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one keeps in mind that truth-related progress is defined as ‘convergence to truth’. It does not 
entail the reverse and false conditional that collective convergence is sufficient for collective 
truth-related progress. 
I will now argue that, despite its initial plausibility, the argument from persistent 
disagreement is not sound since (1) is false after all. If we look more closely at what really 
happens in philosophy, we find a vast number of almost universally and persistently accepted 
instances of newly accumulated knowledge and corrected errors in philosophy. Here is a list 
of my favourite examples that can be continued ad libitum: 
 
1 Knowledge is not identical with justified true belief (Gettier 1963). (Almost 
everyone accepted this immediately after confronting Gettier cases.) 
2 There is rigid designation. (Even die-hard descriptivists accepted that in the 
Kripke cases reference does not correlate with description (Kripke 1980).) 
3 Incompatibilist conceptions of free will run the risk of confusing free will 
with luck. If one’s decision is not determined by one’s own reasons, then it 
seems to be a matter of pure luck that the decision is what it is. (Current 
proponents of incompatibilism still see Hume’s challenge as a basic threat 
to their position (Hume 1975: 96).) 
4 Moral facts supervene on descriptive truths about an action. (Richard Hare 
pointed out that there cannot be a moral difference between two actions 
unless there is a descriptive difference between them (Hare 1952).) 
5 What ought to be the case cannot be deduced from what is the case. 
(Hume’s insight that it is a fallacy to derive normative conclusions from 
purely descriptive premises has become nearly universally accepted (Hume 
1978: 469).) 
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6 The ‘a priori’ and the ‘necessary’ are neither the same nor necessarily 
correlated. (Kripke’s claims that the former is an epistemic concept whereas 
the latter is a metaphysical concept and that each can be instantiated apart 
from the other have been widely accepted (Kripke 1980).) 
7 Resemblance nominalism fails because of its limited explanatory power. 
(Armstrong’s argument (Armstrong 1989) has been widely accepted. 
Nevertheless, he admits that this is not a victory over nominalism in 
general. There are other kinds of nominalism such as, e.g., trope theory that 
cannot be ruled out in this way.) 
8 Epistemic theories of truth are no longer tenable. (At the end of a lively 
debate about epistemic theories of truth in the 1980s and 1990s, it turned 
out that even with the help of strong idealisation, epistemic theories of truth 
do not work. This has been accepted by the vast majority of experts. 
Nevertheless, the correct positive view of truth is still controversial.) 
9 The principle of the identity of indiscernibles is false. (Max Black’s 1952 
counterexample of a very simple universe that contains nothing but two 
indistinguishable spheres has been widely accepted.) 
10 Analytic behaviourism is false. (The view that all mental concepts can be 
analysed in terms of behavioural dispositions was refuted by Hilary 
Putnam’s conceivable case of a Super-Spartan (Putnam 1963: 332-334) who 
has no disposition to show his strong pain.) 
11 Analytic phenomenalism is false. (Roderick Chisholm’s argument 
(Chisholm 1957) that statements about the objective physical world cannot 
be translated into counterfactual statements about sense experiences was 
widely accepted and marked the end of analytic phenomenalism.) 
12 All classic proofs of God’s existence fail. 
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13 There is widespread agreement that skepticism about the external world is 
unreasonable. (According to the 2009 PhilPaper Survey, only 4.8% of 
professional philosophers are skeptics.) 
 
As I have indicated above, I believe that this list could be continued, perhaps not endlessly but 
with many more entries. What does the existence of this (presumably very long) list show? If 
it is true of every entry on the list that it is currently widely accepted although this was not 
always the case, then this clearly indicates collective convergence. That would be evidence 
for the falsity of premise (1), though it is not positive evidence for truth-related progress 
since, as already noted, collective convergence may also be convergence to the false.  
Do we find collective convergence of philosophical views on just about everything? 
Or is there a particular pattern in the propositions that philosophers tend to agree upon over 
time? In this regard, the following three observations are relevant. First, collective 
convergence of philosophical views is limited in extension. Although such convergence does 
not seem to be a rare exception, there are far more cases of persistent disagreement. Second, 
there is much more convergence on what counts as an error (standard definition of 
knowledge, deducing ‘ought’ from ‘is’, confusing the a priori with necessity, resemblance 
nominalism, epistemic theories of truth, the principle of the identity of indiscernibles, analytic 
behaviourism, analytic phenomenalism) or a bad argument (classic proofs of God’s existence, 
arguments for external world skepticism) than on positive answers. Third, agreed-upon 
positive views (rigid designation, moral supervenience) are almost always restricted to highly 
specific issues rather than being answers to big and central questions of philosophy.  
Thus, on the one hand, it is simply not true that there is no collective convergence of 
views in philosophy, as premise (1) of the above argument from persistent disagreement 
claims. On the other hand, collective convergence in philosophy seems to be severely 
restricted in several ways: there are fewer cases of such convergence than in the sciences, we 
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find convergence much more often concerning errors than concerning positive views, and 
there is a significant lack of converging positive answers to the big philosophical questions. 
Although there is no good reason to accept progress skepticism, a moderate position such as 
the limited progress view seems reasonable.
7
 However, one should not be too pessimistic. 
Some philosophers claim that the identification of errors is of no help in finding positive 
answers to our big questions (see Brennan 2010: 10). But this is an overstatement. Often there 
is only a limited number of plausible answers to a given question. By eliminating the 
candidates one by one, the number of available options is typically reduced so that at a certain 
time in the future only one position will be left.
8
 Sometimes we even achieve the positive 
answer by one single step of elimination. Consider the principle of the identity of 
indiscernibles. Just by finding out that this principle is false we discover that there can be two 
things exactly alike in the universe. At other times, the method of elimination has brought us 
nearer to a positive answer, albeit not yet all the way. When we found out that resemblance 
nominalism is false, this did not tell us what types really are. Nor does it even rule out all 
kinds of nominalism. Something similar is true for theories of truth. By simply ruling out 
epistemic theories, we cannot decide whether a version of the correspondence theory or 
deflationism or even primitivism is true. But there is no principled reason why the method of 
elimination should not lead us to a positive view, at least in the long run. We may already 
have achieved this for the problem of our knowledge about the external world. As the 
PhilPapers Survey suggests, external world skepticism is widely rejected nowadays. Hence, 
this big problem might already be solved by the method of elimination.  
 
 
2. Why is there so little truth-related progress in philosophy? 
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rejected theory.  
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If what I have said so far is basically correct, there is no reason to doubt that there is at least 
some truth-related progress in philosophy. But there is still a big difference between the 
degree of truth-related progress in philosophy and in the hard sciences. Chalmers (2015) 
nicely illustrates this difference by citing a list of twenty-three unsolved mathematical 
problems that Hilbert compiled in 1900, of which ten have now clearly been solved. The case 
of philosophy looks very different – in particular if we consider the big philosophical 
problems such as, e.g., the problem of our knowledge of the external world, the problem of 
the ultimate nature of reality, the mind–body problem, the problem of the fundamental 
principle(s) of ethics, the problem of free will, the problem of God’s existence, and the 
question whether rationalism or empiricism is correct. Hardly any of these problems have 
been uncontroversially solved,
9
 although most of them have been discussed much longer than 
those on Hilbert’s list. 
So why is there so little truth-related progress in philosophy? The explanation we are 
looking for must be a differential one. What we want to understand is why there is so much 
less progress in philosophy than there is in the hard sciences. In his attempt to come up with 
such an explanation, Chalmers (2015: 16) points towards a very striking difference between 
the hard sciences and philosophical discourse: ‘The hard sciences have methods … that have 
the power to compel agreement on the answers to the big questions. Philosophy has a method 
– the method of argument – that does not.’ Whereas the (hard) sciences work with consensus 
premises ‘that are regarded by the community as undeniable’ – namely confirmed observation 
or mathematical axioms – and rely on consensus inferences, in philosophy, premises and 
inferences always remain disputable: ‘There are certainly many arguments for strong 
conclusions in philosophy. But in the majority of cases, they have premises that opponents 
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can deny without too much cost, or inferences that opponents can reject without too much 
cost’ (2015: 16). Chalmers seems quite right in pointing to this difference. Consider, e.g., the 
debate between the skeptic and the Moorean. Whereas the skeptic argues from some general 
epistemic principles to the conclusion that we do not possess knowledge of the world, the 
Moorean cannot believe this conclusion and therefore doubts the truth of at least one of the 
epistemic principles that is used in the skeptic’s argument. One person’s modus ponens is 
another person’s modus tollens.  
The following seems true: if we can rely on practically indisputable premises and 
inference rules, then the arguments will lead to collective agreement. If, however, premises 
and inference rules remain disputable, as seems to be the case in philosophy, then the method 
of argumentation will not lead to collective convergence. But what is the deeper explanation 
for this difference? Chalmers tries to come up with such an explanation (Chalmers 2015: 25-
9). But, as he frankly admits (see Chalmers 2015: 27-8), most of the explanations he considers 
suffer from one or the other of the two following problems: they either apply only to parts of 
philosophy, or they can be applied to the hard sciences as well. The plurality of starting points 
may be explained by anti-realism, a strong emotional attachment to one’s moral views, or 
verbal disputes. But we cannot apply these explanatory strategies across the board in 
philosophy. Not every domain in philosophy can be plausibly analysed in an anti-realist 
manner. Not every philosophical position depends on implicit moral opinions. And there are 
surely substantial disagreements in philosophy that cannot be reduced to verbal disputes. On 
the other hand, one might claim that philosophy is extremely abstract, or that we are not 
evolutionarily well-adapted to philosophising, or that our philosophical views are strongly 
influenced by the schools and universities we attended and the teachers who trained us. But 
this also applies to, e.g., theoretical physics. So Chalmers is not really able to provide a good 
differential explanation of why philosophy, but not physics, has the striking feature of 
premise and inference deniability.  
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In what follows, I will propose a twofold alternative explanation of what Chalmers, on 
my view, correctly describes as the key difference between philosophy and the hard sciences: 
its premise and inference deniability. Whereas Chalmers thinks that it is a specific weakness 
of the philosophical method that it cannot compel agreement,
10
 I would prefer a different 
diagnosis: the problem with philosophy as a discipline is that there is no single agreed-upon 
method of philosophy, as there is in physics or mathematics. Typically, when philosophical 
opponents cannot resolve their disagreement, this is not just because they have different 
opinions to start with but also because they rely on different implicit methodologies. For 
example, in the controversy between the skeptic and the Moorean, the parties seem to rely on 
different methods: the skeptic takes intuitions about epistemic principles extremely seriously, 
whereas the Moorean starts with common sense assumptions that should not turn out to be 
massively mistaken (Moore 1959: 226). As another example, consider the controversy 
between a utilitarian and someone who objects to utilitarianism by pointing to cases in which 
maximising utility would lead to actions that we intuitively judge as highly unfair. Typically, 
the utilitarian will not accept moral intuitions about single cases as counterevidence (Singer 
2005). Again, the first-order disagreement depends on a deeper methodological disagreement. 
If this is correct, then widespread and persistent philosophical disagreement partly stems from 
deeper methodological disagreements about the correct evidential basis.  
If there is no agreement about the proper evidential basis in philosophy, this can also 
explain why there are no consensus inferences. Of course, philosophers typically do not 
dispute the rules of deductive logic. But when it comes to abduction or inference to the best 
explanation, we find pluralism about the correct balancing of theory virtues. Someone like 
David Lewis will regard the theory-related value of explanatory power more highly than the 
                                                          
10
 See Chalmers (2015: 25): ‘There is less convergence in philosophy because the philosophical method has less 
power to compel agreement, and it has less power because of the phenomenon of premise deniability: arguments 
for strong conclusions in philosophy … almost always have premises or inferences that can be rejected without 
too much cost.’ 
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value of being parsimonious, but others, such as David Armstrong, will prefer parsimony. In 
philosophy, the validity of these different inferential dispositions cannot be calibrated by 
checking the truth of predictions against an agreed evidential basis because, as we just saw, 
there is no such agreed evidential basis. So in philosophy, the plurality of inferential habits 
cannot be reduced but instead proliferates. In contrast, in the sciences, the validity of 
inferential habits can be calibrated based on their success in prediction. This explains why 
there is more consensus in science than in philosophy with respect to inferences. 
There is a further explanation of why persistent disagreement is much more 
widespread in philosophy than it is in the hard sciences: in the latter, one typically gets closer 
to the truth by making contact with reality within restricted domains, while in the former 
things are far more interconnected – so that one must get it right everywhere in order to make 
contact with reality at any point. This holistic and multi-disciplinary integration challenge 
(see Peacocke 1999, Ch. 1) is typical for philosophy. Consider, e.g., the theory of modality. 
When one attempts to design an adequate semantics for our common modal discourse, one 
must, at the same time, keep an eye on one’s metaphysical commitments to modal reality, and 
one must also be able to explain how such a kind of reality can be epistemically accessible to 
us. Hence, semantic, metaphysical, and epistemological questions are interwoven. The same 
is true for normative ethics that are not fully neutral with regard to meta-ethics or to 
epistemologies that have some heavyweight metaphysical implications (consider, e.g., virtue 
epistemology’s commitment to stable mental dispositions). So in contrast to the hard sciences, 
philosophy is a strongly holistic and multi-disciplinary enterprise in which we can only be 
successful if we keep an eye on nearly everything when we want to solve a specific problem 
in one discipline. This feature of philosophical work makes it much more probable that 
philosophers will make small but highly influential errors somewhere on the periphery.  
 
4. Lessons from my diagnosis of the meagre degree of convergence in philosophy 
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If my somewhat speculative and sketchy remarks about the sources of limited collective 
progress in philosophy are on the right track, two general lessons can be drawn. First, since 
(often tacit) methodological differences underlie widespread persistent first-order 
disagreement, philosophy should turn more explicitly towards its own methods. In fact, this 
fits the new meta-philosophical turn in philosophy that brings topics such as the sources of 
philosophical knowledge (e.g. naturalism, pragmatism, conceptual analysis or rational 
intuitions, and experimental philosophy), the cognitive goals of philosophy, disagreement in 
philosophy, philosophical progress, and the role that the history of philosophy has for 
philosophy into the focus of philosophical reflection. Without directly addressing and solving 
methodological disputes in philosophy, we cannot expect to make more progress. Second, the 
above-mentioned integration challenge suggests that it is more important for philosophy than 
for the hard sciences that philosophers not only specialise but also have a broader and more 
integrative view of philosophy that pays tribute to philosophy’s intra-disciplinary 
interrelations.  
However, my diagnosis of the limited progress in philosophy also has implications 
regarding the role that the history of philosophy has for (systematic) philosophy. As I have 
noted above, philosophy makes slower progress than, e.g., physics since its body of evidence 
is not rapidly expanding over time. For this reason, philosophical classics do not become 
outdated so quickly and hence can be discussed as if they were the work of contemporary 
colleagues for a longer time. But there is more to say about the role of the history of 
philosophy. Since the disagreement about the correct method for philosophy is still not 
settled, the method that is dominant at a certain time is largely determined by sociological 
trends rather than by arguments. But then there is a real threat that there are no fully rational 
methodological strictures at any particular time. Reflections on the history of philosophy, 
including the multiplicity of methods that have been accepted at different times, may serve as 
a corrective against a too restrictive methodological view at any given time. Moreover, 
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because it is a highly complex discipline, philosophy encourages philosophers to specialise 
and divide cognitive labour.
11
 This tendency is at least in part counterproductive, given the 
holistic and integrative requirements for proper solutions. Here again, the history of 
philosophy might serve as a corrective, since the great philosophers of the past typically 
entertained views that offered big, integrative pictures. I do not want to claim that only by 
reflecting on its own history can philosophy avoid becoming methodologically one-
dimensional and overspecialised. There are certainly other means to achieve this goal. 
However, reflection on the history of philosophy, with its huge reservoir of diverse 
philosophical methods and big picture views, is especially well-suited to counterbalance 
philosophical strictures.
12
 
Even if the history of philosophy is instrumentally valuable for doing systematic 
philosophy, it can be approached in very different ways. Melnyk (2008: 216–17) distinguishes 
between pure and impure history of philosophy. Anyone who practices pure history of 
philosophy is interested in the accurate historical contextualisation of the relevant text, reads 
the text in its original language, and is not selective in her attention. In contrast, impure 
practitioners do not interpret the relevant text in its historical context, can read the text in 
translation, are selective in their attention, and do not give too much weight to exegetical 
accuracy; sometimes it will even do to study classic texts only through the eyes of an expert. 
However, when it is used as a corrective to methodological and topical confines, it seems to 
suffice that one does history of philosophy in an impure manner.  
 
4. Conclusion 
                                                          
11
 Cf. Bieri (2007) for a critical view on this feature of current philosophy. 
12
 Glock (2008) distinguishes different claims about the instrumental value of the history of philosophy for 
systematic philosophy. Historiophobia takes the history of philosophy to be dysfunctional for proper 
philosophical thinking. Pragmatic historicism claims that the history of philosophy may be helpful, though it is 
not essential to philosophising. In contrast, mainline historicism claims exactly this: that the history of 
philosophy is essential to philosophy. Using Glock’s distinction, I am defending pragmatic historicism here. 
24 
 
In this paper I have argued that, among the many conceptions of cognitive progress, truth-
related progress plays the most pertinent role for scientific disciplines. It turns out that the 
prospects of general arguments for scepticism about truth-related progress in philosophy are 
dim. A more attractive route to such kind of progress scepticism in philosophy relies on the 
observation that there is widespread persistent disagreement among philosophers. Since a 
discipline’s truth-related progress requires collective convergence over time, persistent 
disagreement indicates a substantial lack of such progress. However, a long list of paradigm 
cases helps to support the claim that there is less persistent disagreement in philosophy than 
professional philosophers typically believe. Nevertheless, progress on the big and central 
issues in philosophy seems clearly to be limited, at least much more limited than in the hard 
sciences. This calls for a differential explanation. As I have argued, Chalmers’ own 
suggestion, namely that premises and inferences in philosophy remain always disputable, 
does not cut deep enough. At the end of the day it is the unmitigated methodological 
pluralism in philosophy that offers a comprehensive explanation. Given the generally slow 
progress in philosophy and its so far unmitigated methodological pluralism, reflection on 
philosophy’s own history may provide us with a helpful corrective. In this respect, the history 
of philosophy may have instrumental value for doing systematic philosophy.
13
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